

EXCERPT FROM INTERROGATION OF HOSHINO, Naoki, DATED 19,22,28 Nov 45

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Q. During the early period in Manchuria - roughly 1931 to 1936 there was no great change in Manchurian production, especially industrial production. What would you give as the main reasons for the lack of industrial development during these early years.

A. There might be a number of reasons for this; perhaps, the greatest one is that during that period a large amount of preparation was under way, so that there was no large amount of production.

Q. In what specific fields were these general preparations?

A. I don't have the exact figures at hand here, and cannot explore the minute reasons for all of this, but these preparations involved the setting-up of industries such as the Showa Steel Mills, and also involved the location and prospecting of gold fields. Since Japan does not advance as fast as America along these lines, it took considerable time to lay the foundation for industrial production.

Q. Was there a shortage of capital during this period for development work?

A. If you think of capital not only in terms of money but also in terms of necessary goods and materials, then surely we can attribute part of the difficulties to a lack of capital in Manchuria.

Q. Where did you look to for the necessary capital?

A. We looked first of all to Japan for capital, but there were not sufficient sources from which to draw in Japan itself, and so we looked to foreign countries for the necessary capital. When the Manchurian Industrial Development Corporation was established, we expected to get some capital from America, but due to various circumstances, that did not work out according to our plans and so we were forced to make out with what capital we could develop within Japan itself.

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Q. In the early period - in the first period we are referring to before '37 - who invested the capital; where did it come from; was it local capital, or did it come from Japan?

A. It came practically all from Japan; during the period in question the investment from Manchuria was negligible.

Q. What sources in Japan supplied it?

A. As I said, while the capital did not flow from Manchuria in a

great stream, there was some, of course, and this came from various sources - from various industrial associations, from connections with Zaibatsu, and from private capitalists and small investors - it was collected from quite a number of sources. In the early period, a great deal of this, of course, was invested through the South Manchuria Railway.

Q. Beginning 1937, you have a much sharper growth in industrial production in Manchuria - what were the reasons for this greater expansion in output?

A. The first explanation for such an increase in production could be attributed to the fact that the various enterprises such as the Showa Steel Works, had been completed, the coal mines had become fully operable, and the period of production had arrived. At the same time, the plans for increased expansion had also been developed, so that from then on we can witness this sharp increase in production.

Q. To what extent was this development based on the bringing in of Aikawa with his industrial experience and equipment?

A. For one thing, the Manchurian Government desired that a more realistic and positive attitude be taken toward the whole matter. That is, they wanted the Japanese capitalists to forget their suspicion and reluctance and really get some capital in and put things on a strong basis.

Q. Aikawa was a very special type of Japanese capitalist - why did they choose him?

A. I am coming to that - I have just started in with the first step. Then, the Manchurians took an attitude of welcoming help and the Japanese capitalists began to take more of a definite interest in Manchuria and that led to an inflow of capital. Up to this time, the South Manchuria Railway had, been to some extent carrying on various enterprises, but as the enterprises grew, it became too much for the Railway Company and a need was felt to push the whole development to a higher level. At the same time, Manchuria needed more than capital. Administrative ability was also needed. These reasons for the bringing in of Aikawa at that time. Another reason for calling Aikawa was the feeling that to develop these enterprises in Manchuria to the utmost, the thing should be put somewhat on an international basis so that financial aid could be brought in from outside Japan.

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Q. Your first period of service in Manchuria, ended in 1940. That was about the end of the first Five-Year plan in Manchuria. In what lines was that plan most successful?

A. Nothing went according to plan exactly and it is difficult for

me to say that we made any great success. However, possibly in the field of coal production and steel works, we made some relatively good progress. In the field of hydro-electric development, while we did not accomplish what we had outlined for the period, still dams were completed and the basis laid for future development so that in that field also it might be said we achieved some success. And, I might as well say that as far as aircraft production or automobile manufacturing was concerned, we did not succeed at all.

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Q. How closely did you, when you were head of the "Manchoukuo" General Affairs Board, keep contact with the Kwantung Army?

A. I kept a very close connection with that Army.

Q. How often did you meet with the Commander of the Kwantung Army?

A. There were no regular meetings, although we did meet together often. I suppose I met the Commander of the Kwantung Army once or twice a month, but I met oftener than that with other officials.

Q. What was the normal range of subjects that you discussed with the Commander of the Kwantung Army? Were they strategic subjects or were they largely economic?

A. There were no discussions along strategic lines at all. We took up certain economic affairs and civil administrative affairs largely.

Q. What problems did you normally discuss?

A. We took up practically all types of economic questions, particularly some of those involving development, i.e., the economic development of Manchuria.

Q. Did that include careful discussion of the progress of such a thing as the Five Year Plan?

A. Yes, of course.

Q. What did you think, in the period when you were there in 1932-1940, were the major obstacles to economic development - what were the limitations?

A. One of the biggest reasons for the lack of development possibly was the lack of good equipment.

Q. Which is machinery and machine tools?

A. Yes.



Q. Can Mr. Hoshino give us a statement in his own words, as to what his conception is as to what Japan went into Manchuria for and what it expected to get out of it?

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A. Well, in a word, I would say that after Japan occupied the country, then our policy was to try to build it up, first as a source of raw materials for our industries and second, as a place for our expanding population to go to.

Q. How successful does he feel the taking of Manchuria was for securing a source of raw materials up to the outbreak of the war?

A. Well, I can say I think it was a profitable thing as far as raw materials are concerned; but, it is rather difficult to answer your question.

Q. Well take iron ore specifically?

A. Even the Manchurian iron ore was not enough to satisfy Japan's industrial needs. Perhaps, she could provide up to one-third, however.

Q. That is, assuming they fulfilled their plans, they would still not get more than one-third of what they had planned as a national requirement for iron ore? Is that what you mean?

A. Again, I say it is a little bit difficult to be accurate on that. However, I do feel that even had our plans succeeded, at best we could not have looked for more than one-third of our requirements from that source.

Q. How about coal?

A. As far as coal is concerned, we could probably get all we wanted. In getting coal from Manchuria, the question of whether it would be most advantageous, is another question.

Q. How about food.

A. If our plans were carried out we could get ample food supplies from that source.

Q. Enough to take care of Japan's import needs?

A. I think probably we could have.

Q. Are there any raw materials which they felt they needed which they discovered they could not get in sufficient quantities in Manchuria except iron ore? Any they felt were essential to their national development?

A. There are many, first of all, there is oil and aluminum.

Q. Didn't they have shale in Manchuria which could produce both oil and aluminum?

A. There are deposits of shale and aluminum producing shale which if exploited, might supply our needs. Of course, it would be possible to produce synthetic oil from the coal, but development of its sources would depend upon a great outlay of effort and expense and could not be realized immediately.

Q. Why did they decide not to make that outlay?

A. Well, they did develop them somewhat but that did not fit the needs. I think at the very last they did produce something like 100,000 tons of shale oil but the plan called for 500,000. It was a very difficult proposition. And, as far as synthetic fuel is concerned, probably altogether they did not produce more than 100,000 tons. In another 10 or 20 years, they might be developed into something, but at the present state it is negligible.

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Q. You say that one of the reasons Japan wanted to take over Manchuria was to get raw materials to use in her own industries.

A. Yes, that is right.

Q. However, instead of that, Manchuria proceeded to set up an industry to process the raw materials on the spot - the raw materials were not sent back to Japan were they?

A. Perhaps I used Japan in a rather limited sense a while ago, and instead, I should have said within the Japanese sphere because I was thinking of Japan and Manchuria together.

Q. Although you had an economy where you had to bring in large quantities of raw materials into Japan and you had processing facilities there, you chose to build up new processing facilities on the continent? Why was that?

A. As I said before, our purpose was to develop the whole Japanese sphere. Therefore, we were not limiting our development to Japan proper. From that standpoint, it was advantageous to us to develop industry where it could make the best use of local raw materials, and for that reason, these industries were developed near the source of the raw materials in Manchuria.

Q. Actually, although the plan for food production would have taken care of Japan's needs, Japan in fact continued to import food from other areas, did it not, prior to Pearl Harbor?

A. Yes, there was considerable of that.

Q. Well, if the purpose in taking Manchuria was to make Japan independent, then it was a failure as far as food was concerned.

A. Under ordinary circumstances and conditions, Japan with Korea and Manchuria, should have been able, by helping each other, to produce all their own required foods. However, crops do not always come up to expectations and for that reason it becomes necessary to import foods. Crops fluctuate a great deal - for instance, I recall in 1934 that Manchuria produced so many soy beans she did not know what to do with them. In fact, they even gave study to the use of soy beans instead of coal for firing locomotives. At that time, there was also some thought of imposing a customs duty on the importing of soy beans into Japan and this became quite a problem to Manchuria.

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Q. Now you said that one of the reasons Japan went into Manchuria was to secure additional living space for its people. To what extent did the acquisition of Manchuria accomplish what had been hoped in that respect?

A. I cannot say that any great help has come so far. In fact, just a beginning has been made.

Q. But, as of 1941 it had not accomplished what Japan had hoped and expected?

A. No, it had not proceeded as well as we had hoped.

Colonel Cole

Q. We have heard two reasons for going into Manchuria. I would like to inquire if there were not one or two other reasons - perhaps the Army?

A. I do not know that the military had any other great reason beyond those mentioned.

Q. Well, the Army was very strong at that time in Japan, politically. It was able to implement its wishes. Why did the Army wish to go into Manchuria?

A. Well, it would seem to me, as near as I can analyze it, that their purposes were largely the two that I have mentioned.

Mr. Bisson

Q. You mean there were no strategic objectives in going into Manchuria?

A. Wouldn't these things themselves be considered somewhat as



having strategic significance? Outside of that, I do not know of any other specific objectives.

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R 11 Q. Did that mean the Kwantung Army gave them more control over their investments in Manchuria?

A. What I meant by "safe" was from an economic standpoint - i.e., they realized it would be profitable. It was no longer a risk.

Q. Yes, but was there a modification of the exclusive control by the Kwantung Army of Manchurian development?

A. Yes, they somewhat relaxed their controls - eased up on them.

Lt. (JG) Cohen

Q. When he speaks of "Manchuria wanting things" and "Manchuria's so-and-so" you mean, of course, the Kwantung Army?

A. When I said the Manchurians, I meant the Manchurian government. Of course, there is a very close connection between the Kwantung Army and the Manchurian Government and usually it represented pretty much the opinion of the army.

Mr. Bisson

Q. You were Chief of the Planning Board from July 1940 to April 1941. In your administration of the Planning Board during that period, what were the major tasks - major activities - as you see them now?

A. At that time, perhaps, the outstanding problem was that of a planned economy for Japan.

Q. In these mobilization plans that the Planning Board drew up, our understanding is that they scheduled Manchurian production to fit in with Japanese production. Is that correct?

A. Plans were drawn up for Japan itself of course, but since there was such a close connection between the two countries, the plans usually took in the whole sphere.

Q. Could the Planning Board here change the program adopted in Manchuria?

A. Rather than any idea of a limitation of authority, the plan was to work jointly so that in planning for our needs, we made allotments from Manchuria and, on the other hand, Manchuria

planned for the importing of Japanese equipment and thus it was necessary always for us to make the plans together, so there was not any modification of each other's plans.

Q. Who was the final authority who decided how much of each item? Suppose Japan wanted more pig iron than Manchuria wanted to send - how would that conflict be worked out?

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A. Such problems as that were decided in a Japanese-Manchurian Economic Association, made up of leaders in Manchuria and responsible authorities from Japan.

Q. Who would be the leaders in Manchuria?

A. The Minister of Finance and the Minister of Commerce and Industry and such men.

Q. And, on the Japanese side?

A. The Counselor to the Japanese Embassy and the head of the Manchurian Affairs Bureau.

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Q. In the late autumn of 1941, or toward the end of the year, would you say to what extent economic preparations were adequate for the strategic plan that Japan envisaged at that time.

A. This is a very difficult problem. You certainly was not in a very favorable position economically. Certainly there were plenty of difficulties.

Q. Let's make it specific - on the oil problem - how much did you calculate you had in reserve to cover needs?

A. The Navy, of course, had secret reserves, and probably the military did as well, but we of the Cabinet Planning Board did not know how much, except that they ultimately felt that there was a supply ample enough to take care of their needs until they could obtain oil from other areas. There were evidently ample prospects at that time, as far as oil was concerned.

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Q. Were there any other items which were given special consideration in lieu of this strong possibility of being cut off?

A. Well, we were worried considerably over the lack of aluminum and also of iron ore.

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Q. The question of oil was discussed with the Army and the Navy.  
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and although they did not state how much they had on hand, they did state that they were not worried and that they would be able to take over new sources of oil before they ran out of what they had?

A. I must have mis-understood, or else you misunderstood me. In regard to one of the first questions you asked me as to the shortages or problems in our economies, I mentioned the fact that oil was the big problem and we were having to do something to prepare against being cut off from outside sources. At that time our own production of oil was a mere 300,000 tons while our needs were two million tons, and that was something that gave us great concern, and figured large in the work of the Planning Board. Now, this oil question came up from another standpoint and was not in connection with my work as Chairman of the Planning Board. You asked me my opinion as to whether or not the Japanese military thought they had sufficient supplies of oil for the war they might be planning in the fall of 1941, and I told you that it seemed to be the understanding that they had ample supplies to last then until they could get their hands on the oil in the south. This had no connection whatsoever with my Planning Board.

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P. 16 Q. What were the specific difficulties that developed in Manchuria which may have prevented Aikawa from accomplishing his objective?

A. As I have mentioned a number of times, Aikawa's mission in Manchuria was connected with a plan to bring in capital and all his ideas were centered around a long period of development. However, at about this time, the China-Japanese incident occurred, and it became more and more evident that the situation would not permit of a long period development but would have to be speeded up. Aikawa could not see his way clear, apparently, to try to make such a change in the program; he did not think it was possible to speed it up as was demanded, and since it was evident that tasks more close at hand would have to be taken up first rather than the development of this long-term program, he felt he was not the man for the job and dropped out.

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P. 17 Q. Was there opposition to Aikawa because he was a Zaibatsu?

A. I don't think there was.

Q. Aikawa was friendly to the Kwantung Army - presumably his relation with you were also good - and still there was considerable difficulty in putting his program into effect?

A. The opposition of Aikawa could probably be divided into two periods - in the early period the opposition was mainly on the

part of those who felt that international capital should not be brought into Manchuria. In the second place, when the capital did not come, then they began to criticize him severely. This opposition arose on the part of the South Manchuria Railway, since the plan was that much of their work would pass into hands of the Manchurian Industrial Development Co. Then, in the latter part of the period, the opposition arose in the middle ranks of officialdom.

Q. Was that purely the civil officials or was it also the Kwantung Army officials?

A. These middle-rank officials, mostly civilian although possibly some in the Kwantung Army, opposed the giving of a free hand - they felt direct control would be more efficient.

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P.20  
It. Dorr

Q. I wonder whether you could tell us very briefly and generally what your relationship was with Tojo when you were both in Manchuria?

A. I went to Manchuria in 1932, and at first was Vice-Minister of the Financial Dept. At that time, Tojo was Commander of the Kwantung Army's military police. He was located in Hsinking where I was, and I first met him there. However, we had practically no official contacts. Later, in 1936, I was made Chief of the General Affairs Board, and the next year, 1937, Tojo was made Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army. In that capacity, we did have a number of contacts and did work together.

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Q. Was China thought of primarily as a potential market for Japan's manufactured goods or primarily as a source of raw materials?

A. Both.

Q. And, what would prevent Japan from buying and selling in China, even though she did not have her army there?

A. At that time, a virtual state of hostility existed between the two countries and with the situation as it was, Japan was loath to withdraw from China unconditionally.

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Q. If everything had gone better than you expected in taking of the N.E.I. and Malaya and the Philippines, why wasn't your con-

sumption of military products less rather than you had figured it would be?

A. We did get along very nicely at first and our plans worked out famously but particularly after the battle of Guadalcanal the interference with our holding of these newly captured resources to Japan was interfered with by submarines and other means, and that is one reason why our plans did not develop as nicely as we had expected. There is another reason and that was this: The battles of Guadalcanal and other battles at that time consumed a great deal more in the line of ammunition and ships, etc. than we had planned.

Q. Was the expenditure of military products in the early campaigns, during which they captured the Philippines, Malay and the N.E.I., greater or less than anticipated?

A. The only thing that exceeded our expectations was the importation of raw materials from newly acquired territory - otherwise, there was no improvement in the war situation over what we had planned.

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Q. Was any consideration given to increasing imports of Manchurian aluminous shale with the thought that bauxite imports might be cut off at some time in the future?

A. We were planning on using Manchurian supplies in Manchuria rather than bringing them over to Japan. We did have a plan to bring in this ore from probably Choton, which is in Shantung.

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Q. The expected shortage of bauxite did develop after the fall of Kwajalein?

A. The first plan we laid was to speed up our imports of bauxite from all possible places in the South Pacific, to get ahead in supplies and the second plan was to make use of supplies of shale in North China. And, the third plan was to make use of certain low-quantity aluminous shale available in Japan proper.

Q. Was the Cabinet advised by the Japanese aluminum industry that the North China shale could be processed, by them?

A. I think the opinion was in general that it could be used.

Q. That is not quite responsive - was there some official consideration of the matter and an affirmative decision that it would be possible to operate on that basis?

A. Yes, there was such a decision.



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Q. What consideration was given to further development of Manchurian shale oil?

A. Previously, a study had been given to this, and while it could not be speeded up overnight, still an increased production was planned through the giving of high priorities to supplies for these developments.

Q. Was the priority given to supplies for Manchurian shale oil changed during the war?

A. This was high on the priority list even before the war but it was further increased at this time.

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P.37 Q. During 1944, about 40% of Manchurian-produced pig iron and steel went into the building of new plants and commercial and civilian uses in Manchuria at a time when the Japanese war industries had already been forced to cut down on the production of guns and ammunition. What efforts were made to secure for Japan proper a larger share of Manchurian iron and steel?

A. I don't know about this 40% of which you speak. The use of Manchurian production was generally determined through talks between the two countries and most of Manchurian production would go into the war effort, so I wonder if this 40% to civilian production was not used indirectly also in the war effort so that actually what went into Manchuria was negligible.

Q. Is it your opinion that that is a fact?

A. I think that is the situation.

Q. So far as you knew, the Manchurian economy was completely integrated with the Japanese war economy and the distribution of scarce materials was controlled completely from Japan?

A. As the war developed, the integration between Japanese and Manchurian economies became more and more definite, but I would not say that decisions were made arbitrarily in Japan, for these decisions were always reached in conversations between the two countries, but as Japan became more and more pressed, Manchuria would make a greater effort to bear a greater share of war demands.

Q. Did any differences of opinion arise as to the use of Manchurian resources?

A. Yes, there were discussions on this matter, particularly within Japan.

Q. Where a difference of opinion could not be settled by discussion, who had the final word?

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A. As I explained the other day, such differences of opinion were settled by the Joint Japanese-Manchurian Economic Conference.

Q. How many votes did each of the parties on the Committee have?

A. Four each.

Q. Were there never times when the vote was 50-50?

A. No, there was not.

Q. Was the vote always unanimous?

A. Generally, the discussions were carried to the point where the final agreement was unanimous.

Q. In other words, there were no issues which arose over the use of Manchurian resources in the war effort which could not be settled by complete agreement of all parties?

A. That is right as far as these deliberations went.

Q. What does the qualification mean?

A. Well, there were, of course, many discussions which led up to these final decisions.

Q. And, you were always satisfied that Japan was getting everything out of Manchuria which could be got?

A. Yes, I was satisfied. I think that Manchuria rendered full help. Of course, Japan was actually in the fighting but Manchuria did what she could from her standpoint.

Q. And, the Manchurian civilian economy was cut down as much as the Japanese?

A. Manchuria probably was not cut down as much as Japan but inasmuch as she was not directly engaged in the fighting, perhaps the extent in which she engaged was all that could be expected. But, it is true, that either directly or indirectly, Manchuria, too, suffered considerably cut-down in her economy.

Q. But, she was not expected to make the same kind of contribution as Japan proper made?

A. Yes, that is right.

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- Q. My question is - did you believe that if a war came with the United States, you could win such a war?
- A. Rather than the thought of whether we would win or not, the big thing was that we would try to settle the issues with America and there was considerable feeling that the thing could be settled. Of course, I suppose we thought if we did go to war we could probably win.
- Q. Did you have any exact plan as to how you expected to win?
- A. Of course, about those specific things, you would have to talk with the War and Navy Ministers because I was not in on the details or plans they had. However, from my own viewpoint and perhaps others, I felt that in the early stages of the war, Japan would be able to occupy a great deal of the Far East and with the materials such as oil and other things which we would thus acquire, it was felt we would be able to carry the war on for a long time and hold on to the countries we had occupied. There was never any thought of course of gaining a decisive victory over America, i.e., of landing on the American continent and bringing America to her knees - we felt that America, for her part, would be unable to subdue the Far East and that eventually we would work out some sort of an understanding in a sort of negotiated peace.
- Q. Would you have felt that such a termination would be possible had you known that Germany would be defeated by Russia and the rest of the Allies?
- A. No, I don't think we would have held the same opinions.
- Q. Why didn't Japan wait until it saw whether or not the Germans would actually capture Moscow and defeat Russia before attacking the U. S.?
- A. I don't think that at that time Japan was relying too much on Germany and while it is true that plans might have been different had Germany's defeat been foreseen, the question seemed to center around the issues between Japan and America, and it was accelerated by the American attitude toward China.
- Q. But you did say, as I understand it, that had you believed that Germany would be defeated, you would not have believed it possible to bring the war to a successful conclusion through a negotiated peace. If that is so, I will have to repeat my question - Why did not you wait and make sure?
- A. While it was not felt necessarily that Germany would gain an immediate victory over Russia, neither did anyone think that Germany would be knocked-out so easily.



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- A. While it was not felt necessarily that Germany would gain an immediate victory over Russia, neither did anyone think that Germany would be knocked-out so easily.

Q. Is it a fact then that you expected there would be a long continued European war which would tend to keep the U. S. worried about the situation in Europe, as well as the situation in the Far East, and thus prevent the U. S. from bringing its full weight to bear against Japan?

A. There was undoubtedly more or less that kind of thinking.

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Q. Was there any other kind of thinking in regard to it also? I don't want you to say "Yes" because I put the question in that form if you do not really mean that. If you have something else in mind, that is what I would like.

A. Yes, there was undoubtedly that feeling.

Q. Was that an important factor?

A. Yes, it probably was an important factor.

Q. Was it a determining factor? Would they have been willing to go to war had they felt the situation would have been different?

A. I don't think this was a decisive factor. It is true that in any discussions or thought of winning the war, such a proposition would be taken into consideration. I think the question of primary importance was that Japan felt that she was fighting for her own existence and if that were threatened, she would fight regardless of other factors.

Q. That is, whether she thought she would win or lose, she would fight rather than retire from China?

A. Yes, that is the situation.

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Q. You were Cabinet Secretary from the beginning of the Tojo Cabinet until its fall, as I understand it?

A. Yes, that's right.

Q. I wonder if you could give us for each year beginning with 1942, the major problems of the Japanese war economy? In detail - not merely saying shipping or something like that, but what particular thing worried them the most?

A. 1942 was a period of positive advance in the war and our biggest problem during that year was the question as to how we would make the most effective use of the resources that

we acquired in the territories that we occupied. The mobilization of these materials progressed very smoothly in the early stages of that program but after the battles of Midway and Guadalcanal, the mobilization did not progress as smoothly as we would like.

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- Q. Were the plans which had been prepared in advance found to be appropriate for the development of those areas - Did you find it was necessary to bring in more resources from Japan or less than you had figured?
- A. Up until August 1942 the mobilization of these newly acquired resources exceeded expectations.

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- Q. If everything had gone better than you expected in taking over the N.E.I. and Malaya and the Philippines, why wasn't your consumption of military products less rather than you had figured it would be?
- A. We did get along very nicely at first and our plans worked out famously but particularly after the battle of Guadalcanal the interference with our holding of these newly captured resources to Japan was interfered with by submarines and other means, and that is one reason why our plans did not develop as nicely as we had expected. There is another reason and that was this: The battles of Guadalcanal and other battles at that time consumed a great deal more in the line of ammunition and ships, etc. than we had planned.
- Q. Was the expenditure of military products in the early campaigns, during which they captured the Philippines, Malay and the N.E.I., greater or less than anticipated?
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(Doc. 2117) C

Tokyo, Japan  
5 August 1946

I, T. A. Bisson, do hereby certify that I was connected with the Headquarters, U. S. Strategic Bombing Survey (Pacific), an agency of the United States of America, and that in such capacity I was present at the interrogations of HOSHINO, Naoki in Tokyo on the 19th, 22nd, and 28th November 1945:

I do hereby certify that I was one of the interrogators and that the attached copy of said interrogations number 505 is a copy of the interrogations now on file in Washington, D. C. with the War Department.

-s- T. A. Bisson  
T. A. BISSON

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C E R T I F I C A T E

I, E. E. Danly, hereby certify:

1. That I am Chief of the Document Division of the International Prosecution Section, G.H.Q., S.C.A.P., and as such have possession, custody and control of original or copies of documents obtained by the said Section.

2. That Document 2117 contains the interrogation, No. 505, of Hoshino, Naoki, by the Headquarters, U. S. Strategic Bombing Survey (Basic) at Tokyo, Japan, on 19, 22, 28 November 1945.

3. I do hereby certify that a copy of the interrogation above referred to was delivered to me in my official capacity from the U. S. Strategic Bombing Survey and that the copy so delivered to me has at all times been in my possession as Chief of the Document Division of the International Prosecution Section, G.H.Q., S.C.A.P.

Dated, August 5, 1946

/s/ E. E. Danly  
E. E. DANLY